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WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER VIEW IN PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS:

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Abstract

This discussion examines the development of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy, particularly as presented in his posthumously published work *Philosophical Investigations*. Moving away from the logical and pictorial conception of language developed in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein gradually recognised that language cannot be understood through a single underlying logical structure. Instead, language must be examined in terms of its actual use in different contexts of human life. His later philosophy challenges the assumption that the grammatical form of a sentence necessarily determines its meaning or function. Through the distinction between surface grammar and depth grammar, he demonstrates that the same grammatical expression may serve different purposes depending on the context in which it is used. His examples illustrate that an utterance may function as an assertion, command, request, speculation, or other form of linguistic activity.

The concept of *language-game* occupies a central position in this later philosophical approach. It emphasises that speaking a language is not merely a matter of producing words and sentences but is an activity integrated into human practices and forms of life. Language consists of numerous and diverse language-games, which may overlap, interact, develop, or become obsolete over time. Wittgenstein further challenges the traditional philosophical assumption that all things belonging to a particular category must possess a common defining property. Through his concept of *family resemblance*, he explains that different language-games, like different kinds of games, are connected through overlapping and criss-crossing similarities

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	rather than through one essential feature shared by all. Thus, his later philosophy replaces the search for a universal logical essence of language with an examination of its diverse, dynamic, and context-dependent uses. It offers a new philosophical perspective in which meaning is understood through the practical activities and forms of life within which language operates. In Wittgenstein's later philosophy so many concepts are there, which are related to his concept of Language-games; like- forms of life, use theory, private language, speech-act activity etc. Here I will explain only language game and how Family resemblance is related with it.

Introduction:

In the ***Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus***, Wittgenstein initially followed Russell's ambition to construct a logical calculus capable of revealing the single underlying logical structure of all factual language. However, this ambition eventually proved untenable. Under the influence of Moore, Wittgenstein increasingly turned his attention to language as it is actually used in everyday life. He came to recognise that the perfect logical language of the Tractatus, governed by the laws of logic and exemplified by tautologies, offered no real point of friction with the complexities of ordinary human experience. Consequently, he abandoned the search for a single, fixed logical structure underlying all language and returned to what he called the rough ground of ordinary language. Instead of following the straight, precisely mapped lanes of an artificial logical notation, he ventured into the winding labyrinth of old, historic streets—streets shaped by human practices, social interactions, and the accumulated experiences of generations. This shift marked a decisive movement from the ideal of a logically purified language towards an understanding of meaning rooted in the diverse and changing ways in which language is used in everyday life.

The ideas that became central to Wittgenstein's later philosophy. In 1929, he wrote a book entitled Philosophical Remarks (Philosophische Bemerkungen), which was published posthumously in 1964. This work, together with a later unpublished manuscript and the notes dictated between 1933 and 1935, known as The Blue and Brown Books, helps us understand the transition to his later period of philosophy.

Wittgenstein seems to have developed a broader understanding of language by 1929:

He maintained that philosophy must investigate language, including ordinary language. However, he also recognised that language is used in countless different ways, and these uses cannot always be understood simply by examining the grammatical structure of sentences. Words belonging to the same grammatical category, such as verbs and nouns, may perform very different functions depending on how they are used in different contexts. Thus, to understand language, we must look beyond its grammatical form and examine how it actually functions in our everyday lives.

Wittgenstein compared language to a living organism, emphasising its complexity in the ***Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus***. In his later philosophy, however, he sought to understand how this complex organism of language actually functions in human life. His aim was to achieve philosophical clarity by examining the diverse ways in which language is used in everyday situations. Thus, his later writings are concerned with uncovering the meaning and significance of language in its various forms

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of use, rather than reducing its complexity to a single underlying structure. This does not mean that he only wants to return to everyday language, as some have supposed. He is not propounding a straight forward common-sense philosophy, and in that respect he departs from many British philosophers like, Moore. Wittgenstein believes that 'there is no common-sense answer to a philosophical problem.

A philosopher is not a man out of his senses (in other words he is not like an ordinary man), he does not see what everybody sees. Wittgenstein clarifies his philosophical programme by observing that puzzlement and mental discomfort arise not only when we fail to understand certain facts—a difficulty that science is equipped to address—but also when the systems or notations of our language prove unsatisfactory. It is in the latter case that philosophy must intervene. Ordinary language, which permeates every aspect of our lives more profoundly than any other form of language, tends to hold our minds rigidly within a particular framework of thought, thereby producing what Wittgenstein describes as a mental cramp. The task of philosophy, therefore, is to dissolve this mental rigidity by making our thinking free from the constraints imposed by the misleading or restrictive forms of language. **(Van** Peursen, p-76-78)

(The function of our or the use of our language is normally determined by factors additional to, or other than, the mood of a verb. Sentences in the same mood may be used for widely differing purposes. For example, the indicative sentence "you will go there" and suppose it to be the uttered by the following speakers in the following circumstances:

a) By an officer to a private during army manoeuvres;
b) By a friend to a man who has just said that he cannot make up his mind whether to go to such and such a place or not;
c) By one actor to another in course of a play;
d) By a person who has been asked to translate "Vous irez la"
e) By a young man who is trying to get his girlfriend to go away with him for the week-end. Giving an order, is a different use of language from speculating about an event; both are different from either play-acting or translating or pleading.

Surface grammar and depth grammar:

Two important points emerge from these considerations. The first concerns the distinction Wittgenstein draws between what he calls surface grammar and depth grammar. The surface grammar of the sentence "You will go there" remains identical in all five examples given above. In each case, the sentence can be grammatically analysed in the same way, as a statement referring to a future event. In **surface grammar**, the structure and grammatical construction of the sentence remain same in all cases.

However, as the examples (a) to (e) demonstrate, the sentence "You will go there" performs different functions in different contexts. Rather than merely stating a fact about the future, it is used, respectively, to issue an order, express speculation, engage in play-acting, translate an expression, and make a plea. This variation in the practical use of the same sentence illustrates what Wittgenstein calls

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depth grammar. While surface grammar concerns the apparent grammatical structure of an expression, depth grammar reveals how the expression functions within a particular context of language use.

Context is important to understand the different uses of an expression:

The second point that emerges from these considerations is the importance of the context in which an utterance is made. Without knowing the context, we cannot determine with certainty what a speaker intends to communicate through a particular expression. To understand the meaning of the sentence "You will go there" when it is uttered on a particular occasion, we need to know who speaks, to whom the sentence is addressed, and under what circumstances it is spoken. For instance, is it an army officer addressing a private while assigning duties to a member of a firing party, or is it a young man speaking to his girlfriend while showing her a letter from a hotel confirming that a double room has been booked for him? The meaning and function of the utterance may vary considerably depending on such contextual circumstances.

It is important, however, not to assume that the uses illustrated in examples (a) to (e) are complex or unusual applications of the sentence "You will go there", in contrast to a supposedly simple use in which it merely states a fact, or what is taken to be a fact. Even to determine whether the sentence functions as a factual assertion rather than as an order, a speculation, or some other form of expression, we must take its context into account. For example, we would need to know whether the speaker was addressing listeners who were receiving a forecast of future events in a situation where the primary purpose of communication was to convey factual information. Thus, context is essential not only for understanding the varied uses of an expression but also for identifying its apparently straightforward function as a factual statement.

In order to know that 'you will go there' is an assertion of fact, not an order or whatever, we would need to know the context of the utterance. In Wittgenstein's words, 'you will go there', is 'a move in the language -game 'of assertion (cf. PI 22); as made by, for example, a travel agent in the course of telling his customer what places will be visited on a package tour.(Donald Hudson-p 45-46)

Language Game:

Language game" is the main part Wittgenstein's later philosophy. By way of definition he said: "In the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the words, the other acts on them. In instruction in the language the following process will occur: the learner names the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone-and there will be this still simpler exercise: that pupil repeats the words after the teacher both being processes resembling language.

We can also think of the whole process of using words in language (2) as one of those game by means of which children learn their native language. Language-2 is a builder's language. . The builder calls out one of these words, and the assistant brings the corresponding building material.

Wittgenstein uses this example to illustrate a primitive form of language in which words function as commands and their meanings are understood through their practical use. (Sec2- PI). Language (2) in Sec-2 (PI) is an important preliminary example for understanding Wittgenstein's later conception of language as an activity embedded in human practices. Wittgenstein uses this example to illustrate a

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primitive form of language in which words function as commands and their meanings are understood through their practical use.

Wittgenstein said; I will these games "language games" and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language game. And the processes of naming the stones and repeating words after someone might also be called language games. Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses. I shall also call the whole, constituting of language and the actions into which it is oven, the 'language game' (sec-7-PI). In sec-7 of Philosophical investigations, Wittgenstein extends the discussion by explaining that the term language-game includes the whole activity of using words, as well as the linguistic activities involved in teaching and learning language.

Language is nothing but a complex of language games:

In language, language games are distinct from each other and yet often interdependent. They are interdependent in the way that ordering or requesting appears to be dependent on naming some uses of language are precisely regulated as, for example, those of mathematics or natural science; some uses are harder to define precisely, as for example those of poetry or prayer. As they are diverse, language-game run into one another in the sense that in order to grasp the use to which language is being put in 'game', we may need to appreciate how this like, and how it is unlike, the use to which similar language is put in other 'games'. For example, we shall see when we came to consider the bearing Wittgenstein's later philosophy upon religious belief that a recognition of the similarities and dissimilarities between the use to which certain words are put in religious and non-religious contexts respectively illuminates the nature of religious belief and perhaps helps to solve some of intellectual problems connected with it. The interdependence and diversity of language-games, the fact that language as a whole is dynamic and changeful. The contrast between language-game which are precise and those that are not- all this is described by Wittgenstein in terms of the following simile: our language can be seen as an ancient city; a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by multitude of new borough with straight regular streets and uniform houses.

We divide sentences into a limited number of grammatical types and think that a particular sentence-type has a unique function. The function of a sentence is determined by its grammatical form. We think that all declarative sentences describe in the same way, all interrogative sentences function in the same way; and so on. This is a grave mistake. Wittgenstein says in the section 21 of PI that "five slabs" functions both as a report and as an order- the difference being only in the application. I**n sec 21** Wittgenstein discusses the relationship between language, commands, and the actions that follow them, while also questioning the assumption that every sentence functions in the same way. Section 21 challenges the idea that sentences can be classified only as assertions, questions and commands. Language serves many purposes, and its different uses cannot be reduced to a single pattern. This idea prepares the way for Wittgenstein's broader account of language-games. (Sec-21-PI)

If we take another example, in the interrogative mood, sentences are generally associated with the act of asking questions. However, the sentence "Is not the weather fine today?" may function as a

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statement rather than a genuine question. Similarly, "May I come in?" may serve as a request for permission, while "You will do it" may function as a command rather than as a report or a prediction.

According to Wittgenstein, the grammatical form of a sentence does not necessarily determine its function in actual linguistic practice. A sentence belonging to a particular grammatical category may be employed for a variety of purposes, depending on the context in which it is used. What matters, therefore, is not merely the grammatical form of an expression but its practical application within a particular linguistic context. This emphasis on use rather than grammatical form reflects Wittgenstein's broader view that the meaning and function of language are to be understood in terms of how expressions are employed in specific situations.

But how many kind of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command? There are countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all, but new types of language, new language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and forgotten.

Here the term "language game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

Everyone gets interest in comparing the multiplicity of tools in language and the various ways in which they are used with the diverse kinds of words and sentences that constitute language, on the one hand, and the account of linguistic structure offered by logicians, on the other. Just as different tools serve different purposes, words and expressions are employed for a variety of purposes in different linguistic contexts**. (Donald** Hudson, p-49-50)

What is Family Resemblance? What was the need to introduce family resemblance in in later philosophy of Wittgenstein?

In the Tractatus a meaningful proposition was said to be one made up of the names of objects, and to serve as a picture of fact; language depicted the world. In the philosophical Investigations, language is no longer said to act like this. Picturing or depicting the world is discarded as a meaningless notion, there are many different language-games, some of which serve to describe, to assert, to report. The countless other language-games that do not describe, assert or report are still languages; and the countless other sentences that do not describe, assert or report are still sentences. In the Tractatus a word is meaningful, if and only if, it is a name. In the Philosophical Investigations, a word is not a name, a word can be used as a name, but it can be used in numerous other ways as well. (Justus Hartnack, p-56-57)

Now if a language is no longer to be understood as a picture of the world, but in the different contexts in which language is used, which is called language –games; how else it is to be defined? What do the different language-games have in common that entities them to be called a language? These questions were raised by different thinkers. Wittgenstein's answered all these questions in a simple way--

They have nothing in common. No one definite element, no one distinctive property must be possessed by them all in order for each to qualify for recognition as a language. We find only similarities. Wittgenstein analysed in his own way: "Consider for example the proceedings that we call games'. I

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mean board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say "there must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'- but look and see whether there is anything common to all- for if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that….." So, we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossings: sometimes overall similarities; sometimes similarities of detail. (Sec-66-PI)

This kind of answer runs counter to a long-standing philosophical tradition. It seems to be a matter of sound philosophical common sense that anything named or classified in a particular way must possess some property that justifies the name or classification assigned to it.

This Kind of answer runs against a long tradition. It seems to be good philosophical common sense to insist that if anything is to be named as something or other classified in one way or another, then this must be done in virtue of some property which entitles it to be so named or classified. Members of the class of all red things have in common the colour 'red', and members of all the class of triangles have in common the characteristics of being geometric figures of a certain type. But according to Wittgenstein the members of the class of all language-games have no such property in common. This means that the concept of 'language 'cannot be defined. A triangle can be defined as a having three angles and three straight lines and 'red' can be defined ostensively- 'the colour that looks like this'. But nothing of this sort can be said about a 'language'. It has no property.

Wittgenstein defends his assertion by comparing language-games with games in general. What have-games, card-games and board-games in common? He says it is no use assuming that because they are classified as games, so they must have a property in common. But they have not, if we look at these games we find no simple property common to all games. They only have similar properties.

If we compare a number of games we find, the first one has a similar property to the second, and the another-different-similarity to the third and so on. Perhaps the first and the third also have some points of similarity, but these may be different from the points of similarity between the first and the second and between the second and the third. Therefore all members of the class of 'game' have some similarities instead of a common defining property what Wittgenstein calls "Family Resemblance". It will become clearer to everyone if the resemblance found in a family is considered- Peter and Paul look similar in profile but not in facial expression, while Paul and John resemble each other in facial expression but not in profile. Peter and John bear no resemblance in facial expression or profile, but have a similar way of speaking. Peter, Paul, and John have a 'family resemblance' but they don't have any specific feature in common. (Justus Hartnack, p-58-59)

Conclusion:

Wittgenstein's later philosophy marks a significant departure from the logical and pictorial conception of language developed in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. His emphasis on the actual use of language, the distinction between surface grammar and depth grammar, the concept of language-games, and the idea of family resemblance provides the theoretical foundation for understanding this transition Wittgenstein replaces the search for a universal logical structure with an account of language grounded in diverse human activities, social practices, and forms of life.

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